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Mapping Complexity Sources in Nuclear Power Plant Domains  
 
Understanding the sources of complexity in advanced Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) control rooms and their 
effects on human reliability is critical for ensuring high and safe performance of both operators and the 
entire system. New generation control rooms will rely more heavily on automation and computerized Hu-
man-System Interfaces (HSI). Without proper management, information representation and required opera-
tor-system interaction could challenge operator information processing capabilities. This paper provides an 
initial step in assessing the sources of complexity in the NPP control rooms and introduces a systems-





The nuclear power industry in United States has declined 
in terms of growth after the Three Mile Island (TMI) incident 
in 1979 (Campbell, 1988) (Figure 1). The nuclear community 
in the United States is now at a stage where existing NPP con-
trol rooms are undergoing extensive modernization. Moderni-
zation in other supervisory control domains, such as Air Traf-
fic Control (ATC) and cockpit design, has shown an increas-
ing trend in the adoption of digital displays. However, this 
trend towards “glass cockpits” does not guarantee reduced 
operator workload or increased performance, since poor in-
formation representation can lead to poor operator perform-
ance (Wiener and Nagel, 1988; Woods, 1995; Flach et al., 
1995).  
Personnel in these supervisory control environments must 
deal with increasing amounts of information and complexity 
enabled by advanced technologies, such as large digital 
screens and multiple displays. Unfortunately, there is a lack of 
consensus among researchers concerning the exact factors that 
contribute to complexity in these environments, particularly 
NPP control rooms. Without proper understanding and man-
agement of the complexity sources in these control room envi-
ronments, such complexities may negatively affect human, 
and ultimately system performance. Poor human performance 
and errors are costly and not acceptable in such safety-critical 
work environments.   
 This paper introduces efforts to identify sources of com-
plexity in NPP control rooms. First, a general definition of 
complexity is presented and several perspectives on the con-
cept of complexity are introduced. Next, a qualitative ap-
proach taken to gather NPP domain information is discussed, 
and a list of sources of complexity in NPP control room is 
presented. Lastly the interaction between these sources is dis-
cussed.   
 
WHAT IS COMPLEXITY? 
 
The term “complexity” comes from the Latin word 
“Complexus”, which means “to twine” as defined in the Mer-
riam-Webster dictionary. In general, complexity refers to the 
difficulty of understanding a phenomenon in the environment. 
More specifically, we are concerned with complex systems, 
which include complicated interactions between different sys-
tem parts. Complexity is defined in various ways across di-
verse disciplines and in relation to various systems. Although 
there are many convincing definitions of complexity, there is 
little consensus on the exact meaning of the term (Edmonds, 
1995). Some of the most-used definitions of complexity are 
often tied to a collection of interconnected parts, or so called 
“systems”. Some give emphasis to the complexity of a sys-
tem’s behavior, while others focus on the internal structure of 
the system. Simon argues that understanding complexity is 
only achievable by explaining the system as a tree-structured 
hierarchy (Simon, 1996).   
In many of these definitions, however, complexity in hu-
man-system interfaces (HSI) contains several common com-
ponents. In particular, complexity has been defined in terms of 
three separate dimensions within a particular system: quantity, 
variety, and interconnections (Xing and Manning, 2005; Xing, 
2007). Quantity refers to the number of items in a certain part 
of the system. This quantity could be, in the context of HSI in 
NPP control rooms, the number of displays in the control 
room, the number of buttons on a control panel, number of 
icons on a particular display, or the number of sub-systems 
within an overall system. Variety is the number of different 
components in the system.  Variety could refer to the number 
of different kinds of buttons on an NPP control panel, the 
number of different colors in a particular display, the number 
of different size displays, or the number of different types of 
pumps in a system.  Interconnections describe the links be-
tween components of a system. These interconnections can be 
difficult to quantify in a given system, unless all system states 
Figure 1. Three Miles Island control room (Kenemy, 1979, p.112). 
are known. For instance, increasing the temperature of water 
in a holding tank could cause an automatic increase in the flow 
rate from the tank to a heat exchanger.  This “cause and ef-
fect” type of interconnection is just one example of the various 
couplings and links that can occur in a given system.   
   
COMPLEXITY IN SAFETY-CRITICAL 
ENVIRONMENTS 
 
NPP control rooms have many elements in common with 
other human supervisory control systems, thus it is conceiv-
able that complexities in NPP control rooms may share com-
monalities with sources in other supervisory control systems. 
 Cummings and Tsonis (2006) proposed a Human Supervisory 
Control (HSC) complexity chain in an effort to isolate specific 
categories of complexity sources within HSC socio-technical 
systems, in particular the air traffic control domain (Figure 2). 
The HSC complexity chain identifies environmental complex-
ity as the objective state of complexity that exists in the world 
and cognitive complexity as the complexity perceived by a 
human operator. In the case of a complex environment (NPPs, 
for example), perceived complexity could be quite high, po-
tentially negatively impacting safe operator performance. For 
example, many NPPs have redundant systems for safety rea-
sons. However, including a redundant system could double the 
amount of information available to the operator (including 
displays and controls), which could increase an operator’s 
cognitive complexity. To mitigate cognitive complexity, orga-
nizational policies and procedures along with information rep-
resentations in the form of interfaces and displays, can be in-
troduced into the system. However, the introduction of these 
mitigations and devices also can add to the overall perceived 
complexity of the operator. 
 
 
Figure 2. Modified Human Supervisory Control complexity chain, 
adapted from Cummings and Tsonis, 2006. 
 
Organizational complexity represents the additional con-
straints placed upon the system by operational requirements, 
such as the number of crewmembers in the control room, 
emergency procedures, or shift length. The original HSC 
complexity chain contained a display complexity category, 
which considered the complexities offered by visualizations 
found in the display. This interpretation only recognizes the 
output to the operator, with no consideration of input from the 
operator to the system, which is required to close the supervi-
sory control loop. Thus, we propose to change display com-
plexity in the original HSC complexity chain (Cummings & 
Tsonis, 2006) to interface complexity, to reflect this two-way 
communication. Interface complexity is the complexity de-
rived from controls and displays, which could include display 
font size, number of colors used in the display, or numbers and 
variety of buttons, levers, etc.  
Though this complexity model is representative of many 
types of complexity within HSC systems, it does not specify 
the sources of complexity within these systems. The following 
section identifies and discusses sources of complexity, relating 
each to the context of nuclear power plant control.  
 
SOURCES OF COMPLEXITY 
 
Identifying sources of complexity in NPP control rooms is 
an important first step in understanding the effect (both posi-
tive and negative) that particular complexity sources have on 
control room operation and safety. These sources of complex-
ity can be identified through a series of qualitative methods, 
including interviews with control room operators, control 
room observations, field studies, ethnography and cognitive 
task and work analyses. Our approach focuses on identifying 
particular sources of complexity within each of the complexity 
categories described in the HSC complexity chain.  
 Reviews of previous research in the aviation and process 
control environments, as well as field studies and operator 
interviews, led to the initial identification of important sources 
of complexity in NPP control rooms. In addition, extensive 
interviews were conducted with personnel in the Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology (MIT) research reactor in order to 
gather domain information. Plant operations at several differ-
ent facilities were observed, including the U.S. Nuclear Regu-
latory Commission (NRC) Technical Training Center simula-
tor and the New York Independent Systems Operator 
(NYISO) electricity distribution control room. Additionally, 
the NRC-maintained Human Event Repository and Analysis 
(HERA) database was parsed for complexity-related operator 
mistakes and errors. The review of the HERA database re-
vealed several additional important sources of complexity  
In order to verify and validate the identified sources of 
complexity in the NPP domain, several domain experts were 
asked to review the complexity sources. In addition, a ques-
tionnaire was designed to obtain data from operators in terms 
of what they perceived as contributors to their job complexity. 
The design of the questionnaire was informed by the work 
done by Xing (2008) that evaluated display complexity in air 
traffic control displays. The questionnaire was tailored to bet-
ter understand complexity in the NPP environment, and was 
used to gather data from operators in different control rooms 
around the world. The questionnaire is a combination of close-
ended (e.g., likert-scale) and open-ended questions to enable 
both quantitative analysis and subjective opinion gather-
ing. This data collection effort is still underway. 
 The qualitative analysis of gathered data led to the gen-
eration of an initial list of complexity sources in the NPP con-
trol rooms, within the complexity categories of environmental 
(Table 1), organizational (Table 2), interface (Table 3), and 
cognitive (Table 4). It is notable that the majority of sources 
can be categorized under quantity and variety, which represent 
two dimensions of complexity (Xing and Manning, 2005).  
The third dimension of complexity, interrelationships, is ad-
dressed in the next section. 
  
Table 1. Sources of environmental complexity in NPP control rooms. 
Environmental Complexity 
 
• Control room size 
• Operational mode duration 
• Frequency of operational 
mode transitions 
• Number of operational mode 
transitions 
 
• Control room layout 
• Ambient noise level 
• Number of critical events in 
previous shift 
• Number of external interrup-
tions 
 
Table 2. Sources of organizational complexity in NPP control rooms. 
Organizational Complexity 
 
• Number of procedures 
• Variety of procedures 
• Number of steps in procedures 
• Number of procedure switches 
• Number of dependent proce-
dures 
• Number of parallel procedures 
• Number of required inferences 
per procedure  
• Shift length 
 
• Number of crew members 
• Number of team hierarchy 
 levels 
• Number of collaborative proce-
dures 
• Number of crewmembers re-
quired for each procedure 
• Number of information sources 
per inference 
• Procedure durations 
• Duration between procedures 
 
 
Table 3. Sources of interface complexity in NPP control rooms. 
Interface Complexity 
 
• Number of displays 
• Display size 
• Information amount 
• Variety of fonts 
• Font size 
• Number of icons 
• Variety of icons 
• Variety of colors 
• Number of alarms 
• Variety of alarms 
• Alarm duration 
• Display resolution 
• Number of shared control 
devices 
• Number of shared displays 
• Display luminance 
• Clutter 
• Text to graphic ratio 
• Refresh rates 
 
 
• Real-time update rate 
• Number of animated display 
features 
• Number of required unit con-
versions 
• Variety of displays 
• Number of redundant displays 
• Number of control devices 
• Variety of control devices 
• Number of redundant control 
devices 
• Distance between control de-
vices 
• Distance between displays 
• Distance between control de-
vices and displays 
• Distance between controls and 
their associated displays 
 
 
Table 4. Sources of cognitive complexity in NPP control rooms. 
Cognitive Complexity 
 
• Cognitive fatigue 
• Number of years of experience 
in other control rooms 
• Number of years of experience 
in same control room 
 
• Number of years of working 
with same crew (team famili-
arity) 
• Number of simulator hours 
completed per operator 
• Boredom 	  
 
Some of the identified sources in Table 1 are associated 
with operational modes. An operational mode at any given 
time could be defined in terms of the reactor’s status. Through 
operator interviews and observations, four modes were identi-
fied: monitoring, normal, urgent and emergent. Broadly stated, 
monitoring and normal modes are associated with low cogni-
tive workload whereas urgent and emergent modes usually 
involve high cognitive workload. In addition, monitoring and 
normal modes are related to boredom, which is due to under-
arousal, caused by insufficient workload (Pattyn et al., 2008). 
Although fatigue and boredom are highly interconnected, cog-
nitive fatigue, which is caused by high mental effort, could be 
associated with urgent and emergent modes. 
 
COMPLEXITY SOURCE NETWORK  
 
One problem that can be seen on inspection of the sources 
of complexity in Tables 1-4 is the lack of explicit representa-
tion of interconnections between these sources. We propose 
that the interconnections between NPP sources of complexity 
can be represented and explored via a network representation. 
The Complexity Source Network (CSN) represents the basic 
sources of complexity (nodes) within the NPP control room 
and the interactions that the sources share with one another 
(connections). Figure 3 shows this network embedded in the 
categories of the HSC complexity chain. The identification of 
interactions between the sources is important in order to un-
derstand the overall complexity of the NPP control room envi-
ronment, and sheds some light on the nature of coupling be-
tween individual sources. Visualizing the sources within the 
HSC complexity chain helps identify the connections between 
the complexity categories as well as isolating the sources in 
different complexity levels. Domain expert knowledge and 
operator interviews were used to identify the possible inter-
connections. The resultant list of interconnections is a large set 
of pair-wise connections, each of which is represented by a 
connection within the CSN.   
The particular CSN in Figure 3 was generated from the 
list of complexity source connections using the GUESS (Ey-
tan, 2007) visualization software package. There are several 
methods to analyze networks like the CSN, the simplest of 
which is identifying those nodes that have the greatest number 
of connections (or edges). The number of edges a particular 
node has is related to the relative importance of the complex-
ity source in the control room. Thus, the more edges a node 
has, the higher chance the source has to impact safe plant op-
eration. In this particular CSN, the node with the greatest 
number of connections is Cognitive Fatigue, with 22 connec-
tions to other nodes (Figure 4). Cognitive Fatigue has the 
greatest number of connections most likely because of its abil-
ity to have a detrimental effect on many activities that need to 
happen in the control room, especially in urgent or emergent 
situations (van der Linden et al., 2003). Cognitive fatigue is a 
prime example of the complex interactions that exist in a NPP 
control room in that cognitive fatigue can be viewed as the 
result of some complexity sources, as well as a source of com-
plexity itself. 
 The CSN can also be analyzed as a whole in terms of the 
number of nodes and number of edges. In this CSN, there are 
66 individual nodes interconnected with 306 edges. The num-
ber of individual components and their connections has been 
described as a direct measure of complexity (Edmonds, 1995). 
The edge to node ratio is 4.64, indicating that on average each 
node is expected to be connected to roughly 4 or 5 other nodes 
in the network. This ratio also indicates that any given com-
plexity source has the potential to impact four to five other 
sources in the control room, conceivably impacting perform-
ance in an un-isolated fashion. 
 
Figure 3. Connections to Cognitive Fatigue from the CSN. 
Figure 4. Complexity Source Network grouped by HSC complexity chain categories. 
DISCUSSION 
 
Identifying sources of complexity within safety-critical 
environments, such as nuclear power plant control rooms, is 
important for several reasons. Understanding the effect com-
plexities can have on human behavior and decision-making is 
key to ensuring safe operation of a plant. Without proper man-
agement of these sources, negative effects from each source 
could potentially propagate to the whole system through com-
plicated interconnections, as illustrated in the CSN. This un-
derstanding will also allow the creation of tools or mitigations 
to support safe plant operation and allow more informed adop-
tion of advanced technologies.  
 Several sources of complexity and their interconnections 
were identified using various qualitative data gathering tech-
niques. This analysis led to the development of a Complexity 
Source Network representation that can be used for additional 
analysis of system in terms of reducing the unnecessary cou-
pling between the sources. A basic analysis conducted on the 
preliminary CSN for NPP control rooms suggests that opera-
tors’ cognitive fatigue is a major contributor to cognitive com-
plexity in the control room. If cognitive fatigue was com-
pletely removed from the CSN, the number of edges would be 
reduced to 284, the number of nodes reduced by one, and the 
resultant edge to node ratio would be 4.37.  By removing this 
one node from the CSN, the ratio would decrease by nearly 
6.8%, which would theoretically remove relatively that much 
complexity from the NPP control room. The idea of removing 
a node from the network can be extended to all nodes and 
edges in the network.  By systematically identifying sources of 
complexity that have high impact potential, specific tools and 
mitigation strategies can be developed to ensure safe human 
performance in both control rooms and other complex super-
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